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Abstract: 
The theoretical agenda of this paper is to bring airports and airline operations more squarely into 
the mainstream of the urban and regional development literature. The paper examines the spatial 
and temporal patterns of air passenger flows by airport in the US Carolinas. An emphasis is 
placed on articulating the linkages that exist between airport operations at the local level, the 
structural composition of the regional economy, and the competitive strategies of the airline 
industry. Particular attention was paid to administrative and auxiliary employment levels because 
it is a knowledge-based producer service that tends to seek out markets that offer high levels of 
air service connectivity to other places. A major finding in this paper is that those US Carolina 
airports that experienced significant gains in air passenger volume (e.g., Charlotte and Raleigh-
Durham) tended to experience comparable gains in the employment levels of administrative and 
auxiliary workers, particularly in the manufacturing sector. 
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1. Introduction 
During the post-deregulation era, air transportation research has focused on a wide range of 
issues including competitive strategy, pricing, service, safety and industry structure, although the 
geographic aspects inherent to these issues have been frequently ignored or underemphasized 
(Goetz, 1997; Debbage, 1993; Sorenson, 1991). Yet the dramatic changes in the spatial structure 
of airline route networks can radically alter the competitive and locational advantage of specific 
places particularly as airlines can now more freely enter and exit the marketplace. Exploring 
such issues are of critical importance if we are to better understand the role that passenger air 
transportation plays in shaping the economic geography of places, particularly in the context of 
the national and regional space-economy. Although economists and geographers have 
traditionally appreciated the potential role of transportation in shaping regional economies, this 
paper attempts to improve our understanding of how air transportation can influence local 
economies by stressing the interconnectedness of airport operations at the local level, the 
structural composition of the metropolitan economy, and the broader consequences of 
competitive airline strategies at the regional and national level. More specifically, this paper 
examines the spatial and temporal patterns of air passenger flows by airport for a particularly 
dynamic and fast-growing region of the United States — the mid-Atlantic region of North and 
South Carolina. The mid-Atlantic or Carolinas region is an area that has experienced radical 
changes in airline and airport operations since deregulation (Goetz, 1993), and the regional 
economy is one of the most dynamic and rapidly changing in the nation. Essentially, two 
important questions are posed: (1) what role have the competitive strategies of the airline 
industry played in shaping the spatial and temporal distribution of passenger enplanements in the 
Carolinas from 1973 to 1995? and (2) how connected are these changes in air passenger volume 
to the underlying processes of economic restructuring in the urban core counties of the Carolinas 
that are most impacted by airport-related development? 
2. Air transportation and economic development: a literature review 
A growing body of work is beginning to address the important linkages between air 
transportation and the economic development of regions. Jemiolo and Oster (1987) examined 
regional changes in small community air service since deregulation while Fleming and Ghobrial 
(1994) analyzed the determinants of regional air travel demand in the southeastern US by 
assessing the effect of certain economic activities on regional air travel. 
 
Others have attempted to link air traffic patterns and employment in cities, especially Goetz 
(1992) who found that prior growth in the population and employment levels of a metropolitan 
area partly explained subsequently higher levels of air passengers per capita. However, Goetz 
(1992) provided empirical evidence to suggest that the strength of this relationship has 
diminished over time. He suggested that any argument for adding airport capacity solely to 
stimulate regional growth may be flawed unless the region is a strategic hub location and/or has a 
history of strong passenger demand from within the region. 
 
However, Chou (1993) appears to partially contradict these findings when he suggests that 
spatial changes in the nodal accessibility of airline service by city may be due more to national 
trends in economic and demographic growth than to the advent of hub and spoke operations 
since deregulation. Irwin and Kasarda (1991, p. 524) assessed the effects of changes in an airline 
network on metropolitan employment growth rates in manufacturing and producer services and 
found that changes in an airline network were “a cause rather than a consequence of this 
employment growth”. Supporting evidence is provided by Button et al. (1999, p. 59) in a study 
of hi-tech employment in hub airport markets who found that “hubs create employment rather 
than airlines selecting cities as hubs simply because they are already dynamic”. 
 
In other research, Ivy et al. (1995) found that changes in air service connectivity by metropolitan 
area significantly influenced employment levels in central administration offices and auxiliary 
establishments, such as research laboratories and financial services. For example, 
nonstandardized and highly innovative activity commonly associated with a manufacturing firms 
research and development and corporate functions have tended to remain in urban core regions 
where the labor pool tends to be more highly skilled (Malecki, 1986; Massey, 1984). These sorts 
of higher-order functions are facilitated by high levels of interaction with a wide variety of 
suppliers and services with a premium placed on face-to-face interaction, especially in 
agglomerative urban economies where a major airport can provide direct access to a wide variety 
of destinations. Some empirical support for this argument is provided by Ivy et al. (1995) who 
determined that positive changes in air service connectivity lead to increases in administrative 
and auxiliary employment levels for many US cities from 1978 to 1988. 
 
As the national and regional economy continue to experience major structural changes, it is 
expected that air transportation networks will continue to be thoroughly intertwined with other 
processes of regional economic development (Huddleston and Pangotra, 1990; Caves, 1994). 
Passenger air transportation investments can fundamentally affect the regional economy in at 
least two significant ways. First, the airport itself can inject additional income into the regional 
economy by way of direct investment in facility construction and on-site employment 
generation. Indirect and induced expenditures associated with the multiplier effect of such a large 
fixed capital investment can also trigger a chain reaction through the regional economy as a 
complex web of off-site suppliers (e.g., wholesale goods, caterers, ground transportation 
operators) stimulate additional employment and investment opportunities. Second, the air 
transportation route network operated by the airlines can fundamentally alter the economic 
linkages a region has with other regions and countries through the movement of goods and 
people. Well-connected nodes or gateways are expected to offer competitive advantages for that 
region vis-à-vis less accessible regions. Markusen et al. (1986) identified airport access and high-
quality air service as a critical ingredient in high-tech industry location decisions. Recent surveys 
conducted by KPMG Peat Marwick, 1987 and KPMG Peat Marwick, 1994 of foreign-based 
companies with US headquarters in North Carolina indicate that access to air transportation is an 
extremely important locational consideration for many businesses. 
 
Macrostructural shifts in the US economy and the rise of the service sector have also 
significantly altered the demand for transportation services and, therefore, the competitive 
advantage of places. Bell and Feitelson (1991) identified several structural transformations that 
have critically impacted the provision of transportation services. First, changes in intrafirm 
production processes and the introduction of computer-integrated flexible manufacturing systems 
mean that plants can indulge in the small batch production of a wide range of differentiated 
products. According to Bell and Feitelson (1991, p. 520), “such a transformation in economic 
geography will place greater emphasis on distribution networks”. Furthermore, the increased 
emphasis on just-in-time inventory and the shift toward the rapid transportation of small 
quantities of high-value goods suggests that those regional economies that are well served by 
efficient air transportation nodes (relative to water and rail services that have traditionally 
favored the shipment of low-value, bulky goods) will maintain a competitive advantage over 
other places. Additionally, the rapid employment growth in the knowledge-based producer 
services (e.g., insurance, banking, legal services) and the increasing importance of face-to-face 
interaction, especially at the professional and executive level, suggests that the propensity to fly 
may be highest in those region's that specialize in these key sectors. For regions with a 
proliferation of headquarter and R & D functions, the importance of unimpeded access to a major 
hub airport may be of even greater strategic value (Bell and Feitelson, 1991). 
 
Another useful contribution is provided by Ashford (1994), who suggested that airport 
operations should be placed in the broader context of the changing economic climate. He argued 
that traffic volume at an airport is highly volatile because of the significant freedoms permitted 
the airline industry under deregulation and the intensely competitive strategies of the major 
carriers. “Not only are airlines at liberty to move operations into an airport, they are also free to 
move them out” (Ashford, 1994, p. 59). Ashford, (1994, p. 61) recommends that “airport 
managers keep a close watch on the operations of competing airports to ensure that their own 
marketing strategy to the airlines is effective”. It is not uncommon for an airport to experience a 
substantial air traffic diversion if a neighboring airport within reasonable driving distance by car 
becomes a major point of operation for a low-fare carrier. When several major airports are in 
close proximity to one another as occurs along the I-85 urban corridor in the US Carolinas, the 
geography of this form of traffic diversion can radically alter over time as first one, and then 
another airport, plays host to a transient low-fare carrier. In 1995, the low-fare Continental hub at 
the Greensboro NC airport attracted additional traffic from nearby Charlotte and Raleigh-
Durham, but the tables had turned by the late-1990s as both Midway and Southwest Airlines 
entered the Raleigh-Durham market and Continental shut down the Greensboro hub operation. 
 
3. Research agenda, data, and definitions 
The principal research questions under consideration in this paper all focus on clarifying the 
fundamental interconnections in the US Carolinas between the following factors over time: 
• the competitive strategies of the major air carriers, 
• air passenger volume by airport, and, 
• the economic restructuring of the US Carolinas regional economy. 
In order to address these interconnections adequately, some articulation of the thorny issue of 
causality between these variables is necessary. Although activities at any airport are closely 
connected to the complex web of urban and regional economic activity surrounding the airport 
region, it is more difficult to generalize on causality. Transportation investment does tend to 
concentrate economic activity to specific agglomeration economies, but “there is no consistent 
relationship between the provision of air services and the location of industry in developed 
economies” (Caves, 1994, p. 8). Consequently, in this paper transportation is conceptualized as 
playing a largely permissive and passive role in local economic development processes. 
Transportation systems are viewed as a necessary ingredient in “successful” regional economic 
development, but not a sufficient condition to guarantee growth. 
The competitive strategies of the airline industry are classified based on Porter's (1980, 1985) 
competitive advantage framework. By classifying each major carrier using Porter's typology, it 
becomes possible to position each Carolina airport in the context of the overall competitive 
strategies of the dominant carrier(s) at each airport. 
 
Air passenger volume data and employment data were collected for the 10 largest airports in the 
Carolinas for each of the three study years — 1973, 1983, and 1995. These years were chosen to 
asess the structural change in the airline industry for the 10 year period centered on the 1978 
Airline Deregulation Act and for the most recent year at the time of writing. 
 
Air passenger data for each city were obtained from the annual reports on Airport Activity 
Statistics of the Certified Route Carriers published by the Federal Aviation Administration, 1973, 
Federal Aviation Administration, 1983 and Federal Aviation Administration, 1995. Employment 
data were collected from County Business Patterns published annually by the US Department of 
Commerce, 1973, US Department of Commerce, 1983 and US Department of Commerce, 1995 
for the urban core counties that hosted the three largest airports in the Carolinas in terms of 
passenger volume. These airports included: the Charlotte Douglas International Airport 
(Mecklenburg County), the Raleigh-Durham International Airport (Wake-Durham Counties or 
Triangle area), and the Piedmont Triad International Airport (Guilford-Forsyth Counties or the 
Triad area). Data extracted from County Business Patterns included the number of employees, 
annual payroll, and the number of establishments for select sectors of the economy in each 
county. 
 
Particular attention was paid to the administrative and auxiliary sector because it is an excellent 
example of the sorts of knowledge-based producer services that tend to generate high 
propensities to fly and often seek out metropolitan markets and labor pools that offer high levels 
of connectivity to other places. Some examples of activities commonly performed by 
adminstrative and auxiliary workers include research and development laboratories, financial 
services, accounting, data processing, legal services, marketing, and public relations. Analyzing 
adminstrative and auxiliary workers can provide a broad measure of overall professional 
employment levels although the category also includes some non-professional labor (e.g., 
warehouse and distribution employees). Studying the changing composition of administrative 
and auxiliary workers in the largest Carolina air transportation markets provides an opportunity 
to extend the work of Ivy et al. (1995) who found that changes in air service connectivity 
significantly influenced employment levels in adminstrative and auxiliary establishments. 
 
This research focuses on the 10 largest airports in the Carolinas (in terms of scheduled jet service 
by a major carrier) and so does not include those airports that attract primarily charter and/or 
commuter air service (e.g., Greenville NC and Hickory NC). Commuter air carriers (e.g., US Air 
Express) and small feeder airports are critically important to the areas they serve but they are not 
the central focus of this paper. 
 
We now turn our attention to the various competitive strategies employed by the airline industry 
that affected the competitive advantage of both air carriers and places. 
 
4. Porter's competitive advantage in the airline industry: theory and practice 
4.1. The value of defining and categorizing competitive strategies in the airline industry 
While the work of Goetz, 1992, Goetz, 1993 and Goetz, 1997 and others (Bell and Feitelson, 
1991; Caves, 1994; Ivy et al., 1995) enhance our understanding of the complex connections 
between air transportation and economic development, they tend to underplay the significant role 
that the competitive strategies of the airlines themselves can play in determining the success or 
failure of both airport operations and regional economies. According to Kling et al. (1991), a 
competitive strategy requires significant investments and a long-term plan against which specific 
goals and objectives can be measured. While strategic decisions should be explicitly 
distinguished from short-term tactical decisions that relate to routine business decisions this can 
be difficult to do in an industry as complex and innovative as the airline industry. However, 
identifying broad competitive trends can help us better understand how volatility in air passenger 
flows at specific airports can affect regional and local development processes. “It is easier 
psychologically to understand the competitive dynamics of an industry if we can identify three or 
four similar groups rather than having to characterize each firm seperately” (Kling and Smith, 
1995, p. 26). 
 
4.2. Porter's competitive advantage 
Porter, 1980 and Porter, 1985 has provided a suitable framework by identifying three generic 
strategies that can be applied to the air transportation industry: differentiation, focus, and cost 
leadership. In a `differentiation strategy', an airline might attempt to be unique by offering a set 
of attributes that are widely valued by consumers. Carriers can differentiate the product by 
offering convenient schedules, an expanded seating capacity in business class, extensive frequent 
flyer programs, superior gate locations at an airport, and improved overall service (e.g., ticketing, 
boarding, and in-flight service). Kling and Smith (1995) identified American, Delta, and United 
as carriers pursuing differentiation strategies based on significant amenities beyond basic flight 
services and an image founded on the `we fly anywhere you want to go’ model. 
 
In a “focus strategy”, the air carrier typically identifies a geographic segment of the industry and 
seeks to achieve a competitive advantage in the target segment. During the 1980s, this approach 
was widely used by some air carriers by developing fortress hub operations at strategically 
located airports where competitive forces were kept to a minimum. By building market share at 
an airport, the dominant carrier was able to construct effective barriers to new entrants by 
controlling a large number of the landing rights and gates. At fortress hubs like Charlotte (US 
Air) and Atlanta (Delta), this has translated into extensive flight service but it also makes such 
communities very vulnerable to the competitive strategies of the dominant carrier. 
 
In a `cost-leadership strategy', an air carrier attempts to become the low-cost producer in the 
industry by improving efficiencies in the production process through scale economies and by 
lowering the costs of production. The cost leader through the 1980s and mid-1990s was 
Southwest Airlines. Southwest has consistently emphasized a low-fare, low-cost corporate 
philosophy by offering a short-haul, rapid turnaround, point-to-point route network in markets 
that minimized airport-to-airport competition and without the high costs of operating a hub-and-
spoke system. 
 
Porter, 1980 and Porter, 1985 considered any air carrier that failed to develop a coherent 
competitive strategy as `stuck-in-the-middle’ and thus unable to maintain a sustainable 
competitive advantage. Typically, such a carrier had not successfully lowered costs or 
differentiated the product sufficiently or developed a coherent market niche. Often times it is 
these sorts of firms that are the first to exit during a recessionary-based shake-out of the industry. 
According to Kling and Smith (1995), TWA, Northwest, US Airways, and Continental Airlines 
are all carriers that fit Porters `stuck-in-the-middle’ conceptualization with high costs and below 
average quality ratings. For the major airport operations in the Carolinas, this is an alarming 
finding given the significance of both US Airways and, to a lesser extent, Continental Airlines to 
the regional and local economy. 
 
5. Competitive advantage and urban-economic restructuring in the US Carolinas 
Many of the competitive shifts outlined by Porter, 1980 and Porter, 1985 have played out in the 
booming Carolinas’ sunbelt economy through the past two decades. The ten largest airports in 
the Carolinas all experienced rapid increases in passenger boardings during the post-deregulation 
era with total passenger volume increasing from 3.5 million in 1973 to 16.7 million in 1995 
(Table 1). The most significant beneficiaries of this rapid growth in the air transportation market 
in the Carolinas included the largest urban core counties of North Carolina in places like 
Mecklenburg County (Charlotte), Wake-Durham County (Raleigh-Durham), and Guilford-
Forsyth County (Greensboro-Winston Salem). These three urban regions played host to the three 
largest airports in the Carolinas and they accounted for almost 84% of all air passengers in 1995 
compared to just 62.2% in 1973. Part of the explanation for the increased spatial concentration of 
air passengers in the Carolinas lies with the on-going development of the US Airways `fortress 
hub’ operation at Charlotte Douglas International Airport, the less permanent American Airlines 
hub operation at Raleigh-Durham Airport during the early 1990s, and the short-lived low-fare 
Continental Airlines/CALite hub of the mid-1990s at the Piedmont Triad Airport in Greensboro 
NC. 
Table 1. Air passenger volume at North and South Carolina Airports, 1973–1995 
Airport location Total number of enplaned passenger boardings 
 
1973 (%) 1983 (%) 1995 (%) 
Charlotte NC 1,105,278 (31.4) 3,763,812 (52.3) 9,588,900 (57.5) 
Raleigh-Durham NC 602,869 (17.1) 1,122,732 (15.6) 2,791,046 (16.7) 
Greensboro Winston-Salem High Point NC 482,443 (13.7) 727,301 (10.1) 1,615,987 (9.7) 
Charleston SC 325,521 (9.2) 407,015 (5.7) 666,365 (4.0) 
Greenville-Spartanburg SC 233,641 (6.6) 299,759 (4.2) 551,982 (3.3) 
Columbia SC 351,962 (10.0) 377,295 (5.2) 522,875 (3.1) 
Myrtle Beach SC 38,126 (1.1) 111,566 (1.5) 379,585 (2.3) 
Asheville NC 147,538 (4.2) 138,077 (1.9) 226,178 (1.3) 
Wilmington NC 76,045 (2.2) 106,623 (1.5) 174,046 (1.0) 
Fayetteville NC 154,451 (4.4) 139,848 (1.9) 155,587 (0.9) 
    
Total 3,517,874 7,194,028 16,672,551 
Note: Table includes only those North Carolina airports with more than 100,000 enplanements in 1995. 
Source: Federal Aviation Administration 1973, 1983, 1995. 
 
Additionally, as the regional economy in the US Carolinas evolved away from its traditional 
blue-collar manufacturing roots in tobacco, textiles, and furniture to a more diversified economy 
rooted in hi-tech, financial and medical services, the propensity to fly tended to rise across the 
board, especially for business travellers. Furthermore, the increased levels of connectivity 
offered by the major hub operations in the Carolinas significantly affected professional 
employment levels in these markets. For example, from 1973 to 1995, total employment levels 
for administrative and auxiliary workers in Mecklenburg, Wake-Durham, and Guilford-Forsyth 
counties increased from 22,928 to 67,735. More noticeably, as the airline hub operations were 
fully developed in the Carolinas, these five urban core counties substantially increased their 
share of professional employment relative to the state as a whole (Table 2). By 1995, the five 
counties accounted for over two-thirds of all the administrative and auxiliary employees in the 
state, three-quarters of total payroll, and well over one-half of all administrative and auxiliary 
establishments. By comparison to 1973 or 1983 levels these were all significant increases in 
market share over time. 
Table 2. Aggregate administrative and auxiliary workers 
 
1973 (%) 1983 (%) 1995 (%) 
A. Mecklenburg, Wake-Durham, and Guilford-Forsyth county totals 
Employees 22,928 (60.2) 47,366 (67.3) 67,325 (69.9) 
Payroll ($1,000) 272,500 (65.2) 656,885 (37.5)a 3,158,652 (75.2) 
Establishments 206 (39.2) 471 (53.2) 789 (56.4) 
 
B. North Carolina totals 
Employees 38,100 70,369 96,270 
Payroll ($1,000) 417,864 1,753,238 4,199,999 
Establishments 526 886 1398 
 
a Due to disclosure problems, no payroll figures were published for Forsyth and Durham county. 
While the processes of spatial concentration may not have been as dramatic as they were for air 
passenger volume, it appears that an on-going agglomerative process is at play whereby 
administrative and auxiliary-related firms are seeking out locations that, amongst other things, 
offers high levels of air service connectivity. Three sectors in particular appear to be significantly 
influenced by the logic of agglomeration and these include: manufacturing, services and finance, 
insurance and real estate (FIRE). 
 
As many manufacturing firms increasingly produce service-related outputs (e.g., financial 
services, data-processing, accounting, marketing, etc.), the traditional distinctions between 
goods-producing activities and service-providing activities has tended to blur. These trends are 
self-evident in North Carolina where nearly one-half of all administrative and auxiliary workers 
in the state are employed in the manufacturing sector (i.e., 47,046 of 96,270 workers) (Table 3). 
While many manufacturing firms continue to downsize and relocate routinized manufacturing 
production processes to lower-wage, peripheral locations, the highly creative and non-
standardized higher-order service-related manufacturing activities continue to grow and seek out 
higher-wage, higher-skill urban labor pools that offer, amongst other things, high levels of air 
service to a multitude of destinations. For example, for the five urban counties under study in this 
paper, manufacturing-related administrative and auxiliary workers accounted for over two-thirds 
of all such workers in the state in 1973. By 1995, these same five counties accounted for 81.2% 
of all such workers, 87.3% of total payroll, and 61% of all such establishments (up from 37.3% 
of all establishments in 1973). 
Table 3. Manufacturing-related administrative and auxiliary workers 
 
1973 (%) 1983 (%) 1995 (%) 
A. Mecklenburg, Wake-Durham, and Guilford-Forsyth county totals 
Employees 18,070 (69.8) 25,282 (70.4) 38,221 (81.2) 
Payroll ($1,000) 227,284 (74.4) 405,453 (37.3)a 2,188,291 (87.3) 
Establishments 99 (37.3) 127 (53.8) 235 (61.0) 
 
B. North Carolina totals 
Employees 25,894 35,891 47,046 
Payroll ($1,000) 305,552 1,087,289 2,506,987 
Establishments 265 236 385 
 
a Due to disclosure problems, no payroll figures were published for Wake-Durham and Forsyth 
county. 
Similar processes of agglomeration and spatial concentration seem to have played out in the 
service sector where nearly three-quarters of all service-related administrative and auxiliary 
workers in the state in 1995 are found in either Mecklenburg, Wake-Durham, or Guilford-
Forsyth (Table 4). Since 1973, the proportion of service-related administrative and auxiliary 
workers in these counties has dramatically increased relative to the state as a whole. Both the 
proportion of payroll and the number of establishments attributable to this sector of the economy 
have also experienced comparable changes in market share. 
Table 4. Services-related administrative and auxiliary workers 
 
1973 (%) 1983 (%) 1995 (%) 
A. Mecklenburg, Wake-Durham, and Guilford-Forsyth county totals 
Employees — (−) 2,279 (70.9) 7,974 (73.6) 
Payroll ($1,000) — (−) 35,636 (63.1) 300,874 (79.7) 
Establishments — (−) 72 (54.0) 160 (71.4) 
 
B. North Carolina totals 
Employees 638 3,215 10,839 
Payroll ($1,000) 4,684 56,461 377,491 
Establishments 37 133 224 
 
The strength of the North Carolina banking industry (e.g., the First Union and Bank of America 
headquarters in Charlotte and the Wachovia Bank and BB & T offices in Winston-Salem) may 
partly explain the significant geographic concentration of FIRE-related administrative and 
auxiliary workers. For example, in 1995, Mecklenburg County (Charlotte) alone accounted for 
36% of all such jobs in the state, and collectively the five urban core counties under study 
accounted for approximately 90% of all such workers in the state. 
 
Although many different factors contribute to this sort of urban-economic restructuring over 
time, it does appear that the changing role of administrative and auxiliary workers in the Carolina 
economy is working in tandem with the evolving air markets in Charlotte, the Triangle, and the 
Triad. We now turn to a closer inspection of each of these respective markets. 
 
5.1. Charlotte and US airways 
One of the primary beneficiaries of the post-deregulation era was Piedmont Airlines/US Airways 
and the Charlotte-Douglas Airport (Fig. 1). Through much of the 1970s, Charlotte maintained a 
steady market share of just over 30% of all passenger boardings in the Carolinas. Operations at 
the Charlotte Airport were radically influenced by the passage of the 1978 Airline Deregulation 
Act (ADA), such that by 1983, over half of all passenger boardings in the Carolinas occurred at 
Charlotte. By removing the regulatory constraints on pricing and route allocations, the ADA 
freed up new entrant Piedmont Airlines to effectively compete and hub out of the Charlotte 
Airport. Piedmont's airline-specific market share at Charlotte increased in just five years, from 
10% (or 141, 089 passengers) in 1978 to a startling 72% market share (or 2.7 million) in 1983. 
Since 1983, Charlotte has continued to experience rapid absolute growth rates (from 3.8 million 
in 1983 to 9.6 million in 1995) to the point where Charlotte Douglas Airport accounted for 
nearly 60% of all Carolina boardings. By 1994, the city of Charlotte was so dependent on US 
Airways (which acquired Piedmont Airlines in 1988) that nine out of every 10 passengers flying 
into and out of Charlotte used US Airways. Much of the logic for this type of increased spatial 
concentration in passenger boardings can be explained by the emergence of the hub and spoke 
route network that evolved during the post-deregulation era. Under the hub and spoke system, an 
airline develops a feeder flight system (or spokes) from outlying cities that focus on a central 
hub. At the hub, passengers are transferred to other flights on the same airline and redirected to 
their ultimate destination. The hubbing airline then benefits from network-based externalities and 
economies of scope, and minimizes the competitive challenge by controlling most of the landing 
slots and gates. 
 
Fig. 1. Spatial variation in enplaned passenger boardings in the US Carolinas: 1973–1995. 
In studying administrative and auxiliary workers by metropolitan area, Ivy et al. (1995, p. 173) 
found that “Charlotte experienced phenomenal growth in professional employment, air service 
connectivity and passenger enplanements” from 1978 to 1988. However, manufacturing-related 
administrative and auxiliary employment in Mecklenburg County actually declined from 1973 to 
1983 from 3461 to 2869 workers even though air passenger volume at Charlotte Airport almost 
quadrupled and Piedmont Airlines went from serving 141,089 passengers to 2.7 million. By 
contrast, employment in manufacturing-related administrative and auxiliary establishments 
almost doubled to 5360 workers from 1983 to 1995 during the period when US Airways 
developed its fortress hub operation at Charlotte Douglas Airport. Air passenger volume during 
this time period increased from 3.8 million to 9.6 million passengers. 
 
It is clear from these contradictory findings that the development of a major hub airport 
operation is not always a panacea in terms of its affect on employment levels. In Charlotte this 
may be particularly true since the level of airline connectivity is not always an accurate indicator 
of community needs. Only around 20% of all traffic through the Charlotte hub originates in 
Charlotte because approximately 80% of all passengers use Charlotte merely as a connecting 
point to other destinations. Consequently, it remains unclear if increases in air service 
connectivity can fully explain the cycles of growth and decline in manufacturing-related 
administrative and auxiliary employment levels. 
 
These findings are significant given the recent happenings at Charlotte Douglas Airport. 
Although US Airways offers an extensive network of almost 500 daily departures to over 100 
cities from Charlotte and is widely considered to be a major asset in attracting new producer 
service companies to the metro area, recent studies have indicated that significant barriers to 
entry exist at the airport (US General Accounting Office, 1996 and US General Accounting 
Office, 1999). The US GAO (1996) argued that the long-term, exclusive-use gate leases at 
Charlotte are a major barrier to entry because US Airways controlled 34 of the 48 jet gates. 
Additionally, the GAO indicated that Charlotte passengers pay 88% more in air fares than 
passengers in a sample group of 33 major airports. High fares and an inability to attract 
competitive new entrants may ultimately hinder Charlotte's ability to attract higher-wage 
professional employment over the next few years. 
 
Another troubling sign for Charlotte is that the merger of Piedmont with US Airways in 1988 has 
not been completely successful. US Airways had annual earnings losses totalling over $3 billion 
from 1988 to 1994, during which time the airline did not make a quarterly profit (excluding one-
time gains). US Airways also has some of the highest cost structures in the industry and is 
generally considered to fit Porter's `stuck-in-the-middle’ conceptualization implying that the 
airline has struggled to develop a corporate strategy that would allow the carrier to maintain a 
sustainable competitive advantage. One way US Airways has sought to sustain a competitive 
edge has been to construct a fortress hub at Charlotte (i.e., Porter's geographic focus strategy), 
but that has, in effect, provided the carrier with a geographic monopoly power that is inherently 
anti-competitive. The implications for the Charlotte economy are profound given the heavy 
dependence on the US Airways route network at Charlotte-Douglas Airport. 
 
5.2. Raleigh-Durham and American airlines 
In the late 1980s, the most profound structural changes in the Carolina air industry seemed to be 
focused on events at the Raleigh-Durham Airport (RDU) as American Airlines attempted to 
establish what became an “ill-fated” mini-hub to supplement and complement the air carrier's 
major hub operation at Dallas-Fort Worth. The new RDU hub was established to channel north-
south traffic along the eastern seaboard. Through the late 1980s, RDU had been a highly 
competitive airport with no clear product leader, but by 1988, American controlled 70% of the 
passenger market. American opened its hub at RDU in 1987, and rapidly increased daily jet 
departures to over 100 flights by the early 1990s. As a consequence of this sort of competitive 
restructuring, RDU increased its share of Carolina boardings from 15.6% (or 1.1 million 
passengers) in 1983 to 28.1% (or 4.4 million) in 1992. By 1992, American controlled 82% of the 
passenger market at RDU. 
 
One of the consequences of this rapid growth in airline service at Raleigh-Durham Airport has 
been the elevated significance of the manufacturing-related administrative and auxiliary sector in 
the Triangle metro economy. For Wake-Durham counties, overall employment levels for this 
sector increased from 1242 (or 4.8% of such workers statewide) in 1973 to 3925 (10.5%) in 1983 
and 11,121 (23.6%) workers in 1995. The hi-tech industry and the related companies of the 
Research Triangle Park area of Raleigh-Durham also appear to have matured in tandem with 
growth at the airport. From 1983 to 1995, the computer/data processing industry (SIC 737) in 
Wake County alone increased employment levels from 1416 to 5417 while payroll increased 
from $26 million to $272 million, and the number of establishments increased from 70 to 384 
firms. 
 
Part of the explanation for much of the economic restructuring in the Raleigh-Durham market lay 
with the attractiveness of American Airlines to producer service firms that required high levels of 
connectivity to other places in order to remain competitive. Under Porter's (1980, 1985) 
competitive advantage framework, American Airlines had developed a differentiation strategy 
founded on the `we fly anywhere you want to go’ model where the carrier attempted to provide 
significant amenities beyond basic flight service. The development of the Raleigh-Durham 
`mini-hub’ complemented this competitive strategy and elevated Raleigh-Durham in the 
hierarchy of places where corporations could effectively compete for business. The construction 
of the $60 million, 26 gate American Airlines terminal building at RDU Airport in 1987 
solidified these locational advantages. 
 
However, the hub operation was never profitable. The recession of the early 1990s, plus the 
advent of low-fare competition on the eastern seaboard, reduced forecasted passenger traffic 
levels resulting in company-wide losses of nearly $1 billion for American. These losses occurred 
just as American was beginning to develop the RDU hub. By early 1995, American had closed 
all commuter flight service and reduced daily departures to just 35 at RDU as part of a company-
wide cost-savings scheme. By the end of 1995, RDU accounted for only 16.7% of all Carolina 
boardings and generated only 2.8 million enplanements (compared to 28.1% and 4.4 million 
enplanements in 1992). 
 
However, in part, because of the significant changes in the Raleigh-Durham economy, it was 
only a matter of time before a competitor filled the vacuum left by American Airlines. In 1995, 
Midway Airlines relocated its head offices from Chicago to Raleigh and began offering 65 daily 
departures out of Raleigh-Durham Airport. Midway Airlines had already sought bankruptcy 
protection twice in the 1990s, and the long-term financial prognosis for the carrier remained 
unclear. Despite this, by 1999, the Raleigh-Durham Airport had fully rebounded from the loss of 
the American Airlines hub offering a total of 244 daily departures, one more than the previous 
peak in 1992, when American Airlines was dominant. Newer airlines in the RDU market 
included Delta, United, Continental, Northwest, US Airways Metrojet and Southwest Airlines 
which began offering 12 daily departures in mid-1999. 
 
5.3. Greensboro, Winston-Salem and Continental airlines 
The Piedmont Triad Airport near Greensboro languished throughout the study period, and was 
largely eclipsed by the major hub operations in Charlotte and Raleigh-Durham. From 1973 to 
1992, the Piedmont Triad Airport's market share of total passenger boardings in the Carolinas 
declined precipitously from 13.7% (482,443 passengers) to a mere 5.4% (or 848,948 passengers) 
of the market even though the absolute number of passengers served doubled. 
 
By the mid-1990s, however, it seemed to be the Triad Airport's turn to be a focal point of 
competitive turbulence in the Carolinas to the point that Aviation Systems Research Corporation 
(1994) predicted that the Piedmont Triad Airport would emerge as the fastest growing airport in 
the country from 1993 to 1998. In 1994, air traffic totalled almost 2 million boardings which was 
more than double the previous year's total. By the end of 1995, the airport generated 1.6 million 
enplanements or 9.7% of all Carolina boardings (up from 5.4% in 1992). 
 
During the 1980s, the dominant carrier at the airport was Piedmont/US Airways, but much of the 
mid-1990s growth can be attributed to the rapid development of Continental Airlines so-called 
CALite system. CALite was modeled on the low-fare, quick-turnaround, short-hop service 
offered by Southwest Airlines, the country's only consistently profitable carrier. The CALite 
experiment was an attempt by Continental Airlines to develop a `carrier within a carrier’ strategy 
focused on Porter's (1980, 1985) cost leadership strategy approach where an emphasis was 
placed on being the lowest-cost producer in the industry. 
 
However, the CALite system was not entirely successful. In 1995, Continental discontinued the 
CALite experiment and transformed its Triad operations into a more traditional major hub 
operation with more than 100 daily jet departures primarily transferring passengers between the 
Northeast and Florida. Despite all the growth at the Piedmont Triad Airport, Continental 
announced plans to further cutback the workforce in late 1995 as the airline struggled to return to 
profitability after emerging from its second bankruptcy in 1993. By 1996, Continental Airlines 
had abandoned the Greensboro hub and air traffic at the Triad Airport dropped-off substantially. 
 
The episodic growth rates in air passenger volume at the Piedmont Triad Airport are reflected in 
an economy that has tended to stagnate through the 1980s and 1990s. From 1973 to 1995, the 
number of manufacturing-related administrative and auxiliary workers in Guilford County has 
consistently hovered around 10,000 workers (e.g., 1973 — 9947, 1985 — 10,988, 1995 — 
9626). By contrast, both the Charlotte and Raleigh-Durham local economies have experienced 
significant growth rates for the same time period. 
 
However, in 1998, Federal Express announced plans to build a $300 million air cargo hub that is 
expected to generate 1500 jobs on-site and offer over 20 daily departures by 2005. The 
implications for the Triad's regional economy may be profound, particularly if plans to build a 
major European transhipment point are realized. The Triad may begin to attract additional high 
value-added revenue industries that focus on the shipment of high-value, low-weight products 
(e.g., electronics, computer components, pharmaceutical products, medical diagnostics). 
 
5.4. The other Carolina airports 
Throughout the Carolinas, the overall trend for the smaller airports was a reduced share of the 
Carolina air passenger market as the major hubs at Charlotte and RDU attracted a 
disproportionate level of traffic. In particular, the four South Carolina airports included in this 
study experienced a substantial decline in air passenger market share declining from 26.9% of all 
Carolina boardings in 1973 to 13.7% in 1995. Much of this decline can be attributed to the 
“traffic shadow” cast by the Delta hub in Atlanta and the US Airways hub in Charlotte. Delta 
Airlines has a substantial history as the lead carrier in Columbia and Charleston, while US 
Airways replaced the now defunct Eastern as the dominant carrier at Greenville-Spartanburg 
(although Delta is also a significant competitor). As a result, the South Carolina airports tended 
to function merely as spoke end-points of Delta's and US Airways's hub and spoke systems. 
 
The concern about poor air service prompted the state of South Carolina to partially fund a new 
start-up airline in 1994 (i.e., Air South) to jumpstart traffic at Columbia — the state's capital. Air 
South's principal funding sources included a $10 million credit line from the state of South 
Carolina and $3 million in grants from both Richland and Lexington counties. Within five 
months of its launch, Air South had exhausted its public funds and passenger load factors 
averaged between 32 and 36%. With losses averaging $1 million a month, Air South began to 
develop intra-Florida jet service in 1995, leaving the state of South Carolina with a publicly 
funded airline that operated 60% of its flights in another state. By late 1997, Air South had filed 
for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection with at least $67.4 million in liabilities. The Air South 
experience highlights the perils of public intervention in a sector of the economy as turbulent and 
competitive as the airline industry. 
 
One exception to the trend in South Carolina was the Myrtle Beach Airport which experienced 
substantial increases in the absolute number of boardings (e.g., from a mere 38,126 in 1973 to 
over one-third million in 1995). As the tourist resort function of the region has become a more 
vital part of the economy, the Myrtle Beach Airport has succeeded in attracting a larger share of 
the travel market, and it increased its market share of the Carolina air passenger market from 
1.1% of all Carolina boardings in 1973 to 2.3% in 1995. The only other airport that increased 
market share from 1973 to 1995 was Charlotte Douglas Airport. According to Airports Council 
International (The Sun News, 1996), Myrtle Beach International Airport was the nation's third-
fastest growing airport in 1995. Much of that growth was attributable to Myrtle Beach Jet 
Express which carried 30% of all passengers in 1995, although US Airways remained the 
dominant carrier with 47.5% of the market. A recent GAO study (1999) indicated that average 
air fares at Myrtle Beach Airport have declined 10.5% since 1994, in part, due to its status as a 
vacation destination with low-fare competition. The GAO report also indicated that fares at the 
other large South Carolina airports all increased significantly since 1994. 
 
Finally, the smaller airports in North Carolina — Asheville, Fayetteville, and Wilmington — 
have all essentially functioned as spoke end-points of the US Airways system, and all three 
airports have been dominated by Piedmont/US Airways throughout the study period. These same 
airports have all experienced significant declines in market share, much like their counterparts in 
South Carolina (with the exception of the Myrtle Beach Airport). 
 
6. Conclusion 
The underlying theoretical agenda of this paper has been to articulate the interconnections 
between the competitive strategies of the airline industry and airport operations with urban-
economic change in the local economy. The local economic structure of the counties that played 
host to the largest and most competitive airports in the US Carolinas experienced changes in the 
industrial mix that are consistent with the extant literature on economic development and airport 
operations. Although it is more difficult to generalize on issues of causality, those places that 
experienced significant gains in air passenger volume and air service connectivity also 
experienced comparable gains in the employment levels of administrative and auxiliary workers, 
particularly in the manufacturing sector. 
 
Furthermore, the shifts in competitive advantage over time in the US Carolinas also appeared 
consistent with national trends. The early 1980s saw the emergence of major “fortress hubs” 
including the Piedmont/US Airways operation at Charlotte. By the late 1980s, the most radical 
changes included the development of “mini hubs” to supplement traffic including the American 
operation at RDU. In the 1990s, the airline industry was experimenting with the “airline within 
an airline” concept, e.g., the CALite experiment at the Piedmont Triad Airport. 
 
Future research questions must include a more detailed investigation of the local economy of 
regions with comparable airport operations, particularly in markets with significant barriers to 
entry with respect to landing slots and gates. An improved understanding of the airline-airport-
local economy dynamic can provide a valuable perspective, especially for policy-makers 
contemplating re-regulating select portions of the airline industry and for economic developers 
looking for locations that offer a significant competitive advantage. 
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